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Abstract
People are heterogenous in the skills by which they turn effort into output. A central
question in normative public economics is how to redistribute resources from more- to
less-skilled individuals efficiently. In addition to income taxation, this paper considers
another policy tool of redistribution by allowing planner to choose the dispersion of skill
distribution given the average skill level of the economy. We find that, depending on the
parameters of the model, either perfectly unequal skill distribution in which one group
has a very high skill level and the rest are completely unskilled, or perfectly equal skill
distribution in which all agents have the same skill level, is socially optimal, but an interior
level of skill inequality is never optimal. We then provide conditions on the parameters
under which perfectly equal and perfectly unequal skill distributions are optimal.
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1 Introduction
People are heterogenous in the skills with which they turn effort into output. A central question
in normative public economics is how to redistribute resources from more- to less-skilled indi-
viduals efficiently. One policy tool with which to achieve this is income taxation, redistributing
resources from high- to low-income individuals. As is well-known, however, income taxation is
distortionary when individuals’ skills and efforts are private information (See Mirrlees (1971)).
In this paper, we consider an additional policy tool of redistribution. We do so by allowing
planner to choose the dispersion of skill distribution of the economy, taking the average skill
level as given.1 By choosing a less dispersed distribution, the planner can create an economy
with more equal earnings capacity among agents. This implies a more equal distribution of
consumption for given income taxes. It is important, though, to realize that changing skill
distribution not only affects how total output is shared across agents, but also affects the overall
productivity of the economy. The amount of output that can be produced by a given labor
force depends on the skill distribution chosen. Taking this effect on productivity into account,
we ask how the planner should use these two policy tools jointly for the efficient redistribution
of resources.
To answer this question we consider a static Mirrleesian economy in which the planner
chooses the skill distribution and income taxes. In the model, the planner first chooses the
skill distribution, agents then draw their types from the skill distribution privately, the planner
chooses the income tax system, and finally agents work, pay taxes and consume. The main
difference between our model and standard models in the optimal tax literature is the initial
stage of skill distribution choice in which the planner, taking the average level of skills as given,
chooses the dispersion of the skill distribution. We restrict the set of skill distributions available
to the planner to discrete distributions with a finite number of mass points. The planner thus
essentially chooses the value of the mass points.2
1We do not take a stance on any particular interpretation of skill distribution choice. However, one may
interpret this as a choice of education policy given that people attain a significant portion of their skills through
learning.
2We make two assumptions here. First, the number of mass points is fixed. Second, the planner takes the
probability attached to each mass point as given when he chooses the value of the mass points. The latter
assumption is not important because our main result holds regardless of the probability assigned to each mass
point.
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In such a world, at one extreme, the planner can choose a skill distribution in which the
value of all mass points is equal to the average skill level. In this extreme, after the skill draw,
all agents have the same earnings capacity. We call this the perfectly equal skill distribution.
In this case, redistribution is carried out solely via skill distribution choice; there is no need for
income taxation. At another extreme lies a skill distribution in which the value of all but one
mass point is set to zero. In this extreme, after the draw, a fraction of agents have very high
earnings capacity while the rest are completely unproductive. We call this the perfectly unequal
skill distribution. Here, income taxes are heavily needed for redistribution. In between, there
is a continuum of skill distributions available to the planner, each with a different level of skill
inequality. The main result of our paper is striking: depending on the parameters of the model,
either the perfectly equal or the perfectly unequal skill distribution is socially optimal, but an
interior level of skill inequality is never optimal. In other words, it might be optimal to use only
income taxation or egalitarian skill distribution for redistribution, but it is never optimal to use
these two redistribution tools together.
In the main body of the paper, we assume that the planner faces a linear skill constraint
with two mass points.3 More precisely, the planner chooses mass points w1, w2 subject to the
following skill constraint,
p1w1 + p2w2 = α,
where p1, p2 are exogenous probabilities attached to the mass points and α is the average skill
level in society. Under this assumption of linearity, we show that the socially optimal skill
distribution is always perfectly unequal, i.e., wi = 0, for some i. The intuition for this result
is as follows. Suppose that wi > 0, for all i. In this case, it is obvious that the optimal labor
levels are positive for both types. Then, by moving to a skill distribution in which the type with
a higher labor level has all the skills and setting the labor level of the other type to zero, the
planner increases total output and decreases total disutility. This shows that increasing skill
inequality benefits society because it increases productive efficiency. Under full information,
income taxes are not distortionary, which means that the planner can distribute consumption
according to its will using income taxes at no cost. This implies that the productive efficiency
3The assumption of two mass points is not restrictive. We show that all of our results hold in the case with
N types.
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gain is the only effect of increasing skill inequality on the economy. Thus, under full information,
perfectly unequal skill distribution is socially optimal. However, when skill levels are private
information, income taxes are distortionary. Increasing skill inequality exacerbates the distortion
associated with income taxation, because the benefit of pretending to be low-skilled is higher
for the high-skilled agents when skill inequality is higher. Therefore, increasing skill inequality
imposes a cost on society as well. We show, however, that the socially optimal skill distribution
is still perfectly unequal.
Next, we question the robustness of the optimality of perfectly unequal skill distribution.
To do so, we analyze several extensions of the baseline model, and find that the optimal skill
distribution is either perfectly unequal or perfectly equal, depending on the parameters of the
model. In the first extension, we relax the linear skill constraint assumption by allowing the
skill constraint to be convex in skill levels as follows,
p1w
β
1 + p2w
β
2 = α,
where β ≥ 1 is the convexity parameter. We show that under full information, the socially
optimal skill distribution is either perfectly unequal or perfectly equal, depending on the con-
vexity of the skill constraint and the convexity of the disutility function. When there is private
information about skills, we provide a sufficient condition for the optimality of perfectly equal
skill distribution. When this condition does not hold, it is hard to provide an analytical solution.
Instead, we parameterize the utility and disutility functions, and solve the planner’s problem
numerically. We show that the socially optimal skill distribution is again either perfectly equal
or perfectly unequal. This time, the concavity of the utility function is also one of the solution’s
determinants.
Second, we extend the baseline model by putting an exogenous uniform lower bound on the
skill levels of agents. The lower bound can be interpreted as skills that agents are born with. In
this case, we compute the socially optimal allocation numerically and find very robustly that the
optimal skill distribution is again extreme. Furthermore, we find that if the lower bound is low
relative to the average skill level, then the optimal skill distribution is the perfectly unequal one.
Finally, we extend the set of skill distributions available to the planner to discrete distributions
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with three mass points to show that our results do not depend on the number of types allowed
in the skill distribution. We show, as in the baseline model, that the optimal skill distribution
is again perfectly unequal, whereby the values of two mass points are set to zero and the value
of the remaining mass point to the maximum.
The paper closest to ours is Cremer, Pestieau, and Racionero (2010), which has a similar
model setup to our baseline model. However, their paper only compares the two extreme skill
distributions, perfectly equal and perfectly unequal, and shows that the perfectly unequal distri-
bution provides higher social welfare under a linear skill constraint. So, their paper only shows
that perfectly equal skill distribution cannot be the solution to the social planning problem. Our
paper considers the whole set of feasible skill distributions and proves that perfectly unequal
skill distribution provides the highest social welfare, and hence, is the socially optimal distri-
bution. Furthermore, in the case of convex skill constraints, our paper provides conditions on
the parameters under which perfectly equal and perfectly unequal skill distributions are socially
optimal whereas Cremer, Pestieau, and Racionero (2010) again merely compares perfectly equal
and unequal skill distributions.
A few other papers analyze comparative static properties of optimal allocations with respect
to certain parameters of the skill distribution. Instead of providing a comprehensive survey of
this literature, we will provide two brief examples.4 Brett and Weymark (2008) investigates
the effect of changing an agent’s skill level on the solution of a Mirrlees optimal income tax
problem. Hamilton and Pestieau (2005) studies the effect on individual utilities of changing the
fraction of individuals when the social welfare function is either maximin or maximax. The main
difference between these papers and ours should be apparent: while we analyze the optimal skill
distribution, they only study comparative static properties.
In our analysis we do not take a stance on any particular interpretation of the skill distri-
bution choice. However, if we think that skills can be partly attained through education, our
model may have implications for education policy. In this regard, the paper is related to several
papers that consider education policy as a redistribution tool in the presence of income taxation.
Hare and Ulph (1979) shows that when agents’ learning abilities are heterogenous and skill types
4Other papers that provide such comparative static results are Boadway and Pestieau (2006), and Simula
(2007).
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are observable, the “optimal choice of education policy reinforces [the] redistributive effect of
income tax.” Bovenberg and Jacobs (2006) constructs a model in which agents choose the edu-
cation level. The government can only influence education, and thus skill distribution, through
education subsidies. They show that providing more subsidies to smarter agents (a regressive
education policy) would make it more incentive compatible to undertake more redistribution
through income taxes.
Another potential interpretation of skill distribution choice is related to Skill-Biased Techni-
cal Change (SBTC), which refers to “a shift in the production technology that favors skilled over
unskilled labor by increasing its relative productivity” (Violante (2009)). Under this interpreta-
tion, the planner chooses the level of SBTC that determines the level of skill inequality between
skilled and unskilled labor. For instance, suppose that the government is choosing the degree
of computerization of the production process. In this case, a higher degree of computerization
increases the productivity of some workers (those who are more prone to using computers) but
decreases the productivity of the rest, thereby changing the skill distribution towards higher
inequality. While most papers in the SBTC literature are positive studies of the growth and in-
come distribution implications of SBTC, this paper could be interpreted as a normative analysis
of the optimal level of SBTC. However, this interpretation of our model should be approached
with caution because we treat skilled and unskilled labor as perfect substitutes as in almost all
the Mirleesian taxation literature (see Naito (1999) and Stiglitz (1982) for exceptions), contrary
to the empirically relevant case of production functions with complementarity.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the model formally.
Section 3 analyzes the optimal skill distribution problem. Section 4 discusses the extensions of
the baseline model. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Model
There is a unit measure of agents. They produce output individually according to the production
function
y = wl,
where y denotes output, w denotes skill level, and l denotes labor effort.
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Each agent’s preference is given by
u(c)− v(l),
where c is consumption and u and v satisfy u′,−u′′, v′ > 0 and v′′ > 0.
The novelty of our analysis is that we allow the planner to choose the distribution of skills.
For tractability, we assume that the planner has to choose a distribution in which skills can take
only two values, w1 and w2. The probability of drawing w1 is p1 and the probability of drawing
w2 is p2. We allow the planner to choose w1 and w2, but p1 and p2 are exogenously given. We
take the average skill level of the economy as given, at α. We assume that the planner chooses
w1 and w2 subject to a linear skill constraint:
p1w1 + p2w2 ≤ α.
The constraint states that the average skill level of the distribution chosen by planner cannot
exceed α.
Allocation. An allocation in this economy is defined as (wi, ci, li)i=1,2, where ci and li
represent consumption and labor allocation of type i.
Feasibility. An allocation is feasible if
p2c2 + p1c1 ≤ p2w2l2 + p1w1l1, (1)
p1w1 + p2w2 ≤ α, (2)
w1, w2, c1, c2, l1, l2 ≥ 0. (3)
The first inequality here states that total consumption cannot exceed total output. The
second inequality makes sure that the average skill level of the distribution chosen by planner
does not exceed α. Finally, the third inequality is just the non-negativity of skill, consumption
and labor allocations.
The timing of the events is as follows. First, the planner chooses the skill distribution. Then,
each agent privately draws her skill from this distribution. Finally, the planner chooses the
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consumption and labor allocations, agents announce their types and receive the corresponding
allocation. This informational friction requires the allocation to satisfy the following familiar
incentive compatibility conditions:
Incentive compatibility. An allocation is incentive compatible if
u(c2)− v(l2) ≥ u(c1)− v(w1l1/w2) (4)
u(c1)− v(l1) ≥ u(c2)− v(w2l2/w1) (5)
A social planner chooses the level of consumption, labor and the skill distribution to maximize
total welfare subject to social feasibility and incentive compatibility constraints.
Social Optimum. An allocation is a social optimum if it solves5
max
w1,w2,c1,l1,c2,l2
p2[u(c2)− v(l2)] + p1[u(c1)− v(l1)]
s.t. (1), (2), (3), (4), and (5).
We denote the optimal allocation by (w∗1, w
∗
2, c
∗
1, l
∗
1, c
∗
2, l
∗
2).
As we are interested in the socially optimal skill distribution, we focus on w∗1 and w
∗
2 in
the above problem. To understand the question at hand, it is helpful to consider the set of
distributions that are available to society. On the one extreme, we can set w1 = 0 and w2 =
α
p2
, or
w1 =
α
p1
and w2 = 0. In both of these cases, a fraction of agents have very high earnings capacity
while the rest are completely unproductive. We call these perfectly unequal skill distributions.
On the other extreme, we can set w1 = w2 = α and make everyone in the society identical.
We call this the perfectly equal skill distribution. In between, there is a whole range of skill
distributions in which both w1, w2 > 0. In some of these distributions, w1 > w2 and in some
w1 < w2.
From now on, we denote by H the type that the planner allocates higher skills and by L
the other type, i.e., wi = wH and wj = wL, if wi > wj. In addition, let pi = pH and pj = pL.
5We use a utilitarian social welfare function with equal weights on all agents. However, all of our results hold
under any social welfare function that values equality beyond the laissez-faire market outcome. The only feature
of this utilitarian social welfare function on which we rely is that the high-skilled type’s incentive constraint
binds, which is true under any social welfare function that values equality.
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Hence, we redefine an allocation as (wH , wL, cH , lH , cL, lL). In section 3, we show that when skill
constraint is linear, the socially optimal skill distribution involves perfect inequality, meaning
wL = 0 and wH =
α
pH
. Then, in section 4, we extend the model in several dimensions and
prove that either perfect inequality or perfect equality is optimal depending on certain critical
parameter values.
2.1 Rewriting Planner’s Problem
Let θ = wL
wH
.Observe that θ = 0 is the case in which there is perfect inequality in skill distribution.
As we increase θ towards 1, inequality in skill distribution decreases and at θ = 1 there is perfect
equality of skills. In the rest of the paper, we will be interested in the value of socially optimal
θ.
It is a well-known result that only the type H incentive constraint binds under a Utilitarian
social welfare function with equal weights. Now we can substitute the skill constraint into the
resource constraint and rewrite the problem as:
max
θ,cL,lL,cH ,lH
pH [u(cH)− v(lH)] + pL[u(cL)− v(lL)]
s.t.
pHcH + pLcL ≤ αlH + αpLθ(lL−lH)pH+pLθ
u(cH)− v(lH) ≥ u(cL)− v(θlL)
cL, cH , lL, lH ≥ 0
θ ∈ [0, 1].
If the planner sets θ = 1, then agents choose their types from the perfectly equal skill
distribution where all agents have the skill level α. In this case, the right-hand side of feasibility
becomes pHαlH + pLαlL and the incentive compatibility constraint disappears.
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3 Socially Optimal Skill Distribution
3.1 Benchmark: Full Information Social Optimum
We first analyze the benchmark case with full information. The planner’s problem is the same
as above except that there is no incentive compatibility constraint.
It is always optimal for the planner in the full information case to choose the perfectly
unequal skill distribution, i.e. giving all of the skill to one of the two types. The intuition
is straightforward. In the absence of the incentive constraint, the planner can always equate
consumption across agents at zero cost, so the only criterion of optimal skill distribution is
productive efficiency. It is easy to see that productive efficiency requires skill distribution to be
perfectly unequal. Suppose that this is not true, θ∗ ∈ (0, 1]. From the first order optimality
condition between labor of H and L, we have:
v′(l∗L) = θ
∗v′(l∗H)
which implies that l∗H ≥ l∗L since v′′ > 0 and θ∗ ∈ (0, 1]. We can find another feasible allocation
that strictly improves welfare. Consider a new allocation in which θˆ = 0, lˆL = 0, and the rest of
the allocation stays the same. The feasibility constraint is relaxed because
αl∗H +
αpLθˆ(lˆL − l∗H)
pH + pLθˆ
= αl∗H ≥ αl∗H +
αpLθ
∗(l∗L − l∗H)
pH + pLθ∗
and the disutility of L type decreases because
v(lˆL) = v(0) < v(l
∗
L)
which indicates that any θ ∈ (0, 1] cannot be optimal. Therefore, we have the following theorem:
Theorem 1. In the full information social optimum with linear skill constraint, θ∗ = 0.
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3.2 Private Information Social Optimum
With private information, the choice of skill distribution not only affects productive efficiency,
but also, through the incentive constraint, affects the set of consumption distributions available
to the planner. In this section, we show that if the skill constraint is linear, then the optimal
skill distribution is still perfectly unequal.
First consider the effect of skill distribution choice on the production side of the economy.
From the analysis of the full information case, we know that increasing skill inequality increases
total output and decreases total disutility at the same time. Therefore, productive efficiency
pushes towards the perfectly unequal skill distribution. However, when skill is private informa-
tion, increasing skill inequality increases the distortions associated with income redistribution.
To see this, consider the incentive constraint of type H which holds with equality at the optimal
allocation:
u(cH)− v(lH) = u(cL)− v(θlL).
When the planner increases skill inequality, meaning a decrease in θ, keeping the rest of the
allocation intact would violate the incentive constraint. This means that the planner has to
accompany the increase in skill inequality by increasing consumption inequality and/or by in-
creasing lL relative to lH . Both are distortionary and involve a cost to society. Therefore, unlike
the full information benchmark, increasing skill inequality not only has a productive efficiency
gain but it also has a cost in terms of increasing the distortions associated with income re-
distribution. Theorem 2 formally proves that the optimal skill distribution is still perfectly
unequal.
Theorem 2. In the private information social optimum, θ∗ = 0.
Proof. We proceed in two steps.
Step 1: θ∗ cannot be interior.
Suppose not, θ∗ ∈ (0, 1), and there are two cases to consider.
Case 1: l∗H ≥ l∗L
Consider a new allocation where θˆ = 0, lˆH = l
∗
H , lˆL = 0, cˆH > c
∗
H and cˆL such that the
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incentive constraint still holds,
u(cˆH)− v(l∗H) = u(cˆL)− v(0)
,
and total output is used up for consumption.
To see that we can make the above equality hold in the new allocation, observe the following.
In the new allocation, total output is weakly higher because it is given by
α[l∗H +
pLθ(l
∗
L − l∗H)
pH + pLθ︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
]
which is decreasing in θ. Now if we gave all of the output to the high type, he would get
α
pH
l∗H > c
∗
H .
We can show that u( α
pH
l∗H)− v(l∗H) > u(0)− v(0) because if not, we have
u(0)− v(0) > u( α
pH
lH)− v(l∗H) > u(c∗H)− v(l∗H),
where the second inequality is true because α
pH
l∗H > c
∗
H . Also observe that u(0)−v(0) > u(c∗H)−
v(l∗H) ≥ u(c∗L) − v(θl∗L) > u(c∗L) − v(l∗L). Therefore, the cH = cL = lH = lL = 0 allocation gives
a strictly higher utility than the efficient allocation, which is clearly incentive compatible and
feasible, so efficient allocation cannot be welfare maximizing, which is a contradiction.
Hence, we have shown that u( α
pH
l∗H) − v(l∗H) > u(0) − v(0). Now, decrease cH and increase
cL until this inequality holds with equality, and that is how we construct cˆH and cˆL.
Finally, observe that cˆH > c
∗
H , because otherwise cˆL > c
∗
L, and that would mean
u(cˆH)− v(l∗H) ≤ u(c∗H)− v(l∗H) = u(c∗L)− v(θl∗L) < u(cˆL)− v(0),
which is a contradiction.
cˆH > c
∗
H implies that H type’s welfare is strictly higher in the new allocation and the incentive
constraint holding with equality implies that so is L type’s. Hence, the new allocation strictly
improves over the efficient allocation, yielding the desired contradiction.
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Case 2: l∗H < l
∗
L
We can set θˆ = 1, then the resource constraint is relaxed because
αl∗H +
αpLθˆ(l
∗
L − l∗H)
pH + pLθˆ
= αl∗H +
αpL(l
∗
L − l∗H)
pH + pL
> αl∗H +
αpLθ
∗(l∗L − l∗H)
pH + pLθ∗
The incentive constraint is also relaxed because
u(c∗H)− v(l∗H) = u(c∗L)− v(θ∗l∗L) > u(c∗L)− v(θˆl∗L) = u(c∗L)− v(l∗L)
Thus, it is easy to find another allocation that improves welfare.
Step 2: θ∗ = 0
Suppose not, θ∗ = 1, then it is easy to show c∗H = c
∗
L and l
∗
H = l
∗
L, but then we can set θˆ = 0
and lˆL = 0. The resource constraint is unaffected because
αl∗H +
αpLθ
∗(l∗L − l∗H)
pH + pLθ∗
= αl∗H +
αpLθˆ(lˆL − l∗H)
pH + pLθˆ
= αl∗H
We can also set cˆH > c
∗
H and cˆL such that the incentive constraint holds, as we did in Step
1 Case 1:
u(cˆH)− v(l∗H) = u(cˆL)− v(0)
This improves welfare because cˆH > c
∗
H and lˆL = 0 < l
∗
L.
4 Extensions
In the foregoing analysis, we show that the optimal skill distribution is extreme, in particular
θ∗ = 0. In this section, we generalize the baseline model in several dimensions to check how
robust is the optimality of perfectly unequal skill distribution. We find that the optimal skill
distribution is either perfectly unequal or perfectly equal, depending on the parameters of the
model.
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4.1 Convex Skill Constraint
In the previous analysis, we analyze a special case in which the skill constraint is linear. In
reality, however, there can be decreasing returns to scale when we transfer skills from the low
type to the high type. To allow for this possibility, we now assume a convex skill constraint as
follows:
pLw
β
L + pHw
β
H ≤ α (6)
where β ≥ 1 is the scalar for convexity of the skill constraint.
Using this skill constraint, we can write the total output as:
pLwLlL + pHwH lH = wH(θpLlL + pH lH)
= (
α
pLθβ + pH
)1/β(θpLlL + pH lH)
4.1.1 Full Information
First, we analyze the benchmark case with full information. Using the above expression for total
output, we can write the planner problem as:
max
θ,cH ,cL,lH ,lL
pH [u(cH)− v(lH)] + pL[u(cL)− v(lL)]
s.t.
pHcH + pLcL = (
α
pLθβ+pH
)1/β(θpLlL + pH lH)
cH , cL, lH , lL ≥ 0, θ ∈ [0, 1].
Denote c∗H(θ), c
∗
L(θ), l
∗
H(θ), l
∗
L(θ) as the values of cH , cL, lH , lL that maximize the above prob-
lem for a given θ, and denote U∗ as the maximized total utility:
U∗ ≡ pH [u(c∗H(θ))− v(l∗H(θ))] + pL[u(c∗L(θ))− v(l∗L(θ))]
We are interested in the optimal value of θ that maximizes U∗. The Envelop Theorem implies
14
that the total derivative of the total utility with respect to θ can be expressed as the product
of the multiplier to the resource constraint (λ) and the partial derivative of total output with
respect to θ:
dU∗
dθ
=
∂λ[( α
pLθβ+pH
)1/β(θpLl
∗
L(θ) + pH l
∗
H(θ))− pHc∗H(θ)− pLc∗L(θ)]
∂θ
= λ
α1/βpHpL
(θpLl∗L(θ) + pH l
∗
H(θ))
1/β+1
[l∗L(θ)− θβ−1l∗H(θ)]
This expression states that whether more skill equality (higher θ) can increase welfare de-
pends on whether it can increase total output. Productive efficiency is the only concern because,
under full information, no incentive constraint restricts the planner from equalizing consump-
tion. Using the above expression, whether total output is increasing or decreasing in θ depends
on the sign of the following expression:
[l∗L(θ)− θβ−1l∗H(θ)] = l∗L(θ)[1−
θβ−1
l∗L(θ)/l
∗
H(θ)
]
This expression tells us that whether output increases as skill inequality increases (θ de-
creases) depends on two parameters: β and the convexity of the disutility function. The intuition
is as follows. First, holding the
l∗L
l∗H
ratio constant, when β = 1, increasing skill inequality means
transferring skills to the type that is already working harder (l∗L < l
∗
H), keeping the average skill
level constant. This increases total output. However, when β > 1, increasing skill inequality
is costly because it decreases the average skill level in the economy. In fact, this cost becomes
larger as β increases, and hence increasing skill inequality is less likely to increase total output
for higher β. Second, the convexity of the disutility is important because it determines the
l∗L
l∗H
ratio. If disutility is more convex, then
l∗L
l∗H
is closer to one, and hence increasing skill inequality
is less likely to increase total output.
To simplify the analysis, we assume a particular form for the disutility function, v(l) = lγ.
Then, the above expression becomes
[l∗L(θ)− θβ−1l∗H(θ)] = l∗L(θ)[1− θβ−1+
1
1−γ ]
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and we have the following result.
Theorem 3. In the full information social optimum,
θ∗ =

0 if β − 1 + 1
1−γ < 0;
[0,1] if β − 1 + 1
1−γ = 0;
1 if β − 1 + 1
1−γ > 0.
The theorem states that optimal skill distribution is either perfectly equal or unequal, de-
pending on the values of β and γ. In particular, as our intuition suggested in the case with
the general disutility function, as β and γ increase it is more likely for the perfectly equal skill
distribution to be optimal.
4.1.2 Private Information
Under private information, the planning problem is the same as the full information planning
problem, except that there is an additional constraint– the usual incentive compatibility con-
straint.
u(cH)− v(lH) ≥ u(cL)− v(θlL).
We know from the full information analysis of the previous subsection that productive effi-
ciency calls for the optimality of the perfectly equal skill distribution whenever β− 1 + 1
1−γ ≥ 0.
As the perfectly equal skill distribution also brings perfect consumption equality without any
further need for distortionary income taxation, it is also socially optimal under private informa-
tion whenever this condition is satisfied. The theorem below follows.
Theorem 4. If β−1+ 1
1−γ ≥ 0, then we have θ∗ = 1 in the private information social optimum.
Proof. Consider a relaxed version of the private information planning problem in which we drop
the incentive constraint. That relaxed problem is equivalent to the full information planning
problem and we know that in the solution to that problem we have θ = 1, cH = cL, and
lH = lL. Clearly, this allocation satisfies the incentive constraint and hence is in the constraint
set of the original planning problem under private information, which means that it solves the
problem.
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It is difficult to provide an analytical solution to this problem when β−1+ 1
1−γ < 0. Therefore,
in what follows we provide numerical solutions. We use constant relative risk aversion utility
function
u(c) =
c1−σ
1− σ .
We compute the value of the planning problem for θ ∈ [0, 1], and plot these value functions
in Figure 1 for different parameter values. As the concavity of the utility function and convexity
of the disutility function affect the result, we compute the value function with two values of σ
(σ = 0.5 and σ = 3) and two values of γ (γ = 2 and γ = 4). The four sub-figures of Figure
1 each correspond to one of the four combinations of σ and γ. To illustrate the importance of
the convexity of the skill constraint on the result, we compute the value function for 4 different
values of β. Within each sub-figure, each plot corresponds to a value function for a different
value of β.
The main message of Figure 1 is that there is no combination of parameters (β, γ, σ) for
which optimal θ is interior. Several factors determine the corner in which the optimal θ will lie.
The first factor is the convexity of the skill constraint. As the intuition in the full information
case suggests, a more linear skill constraint (lower β) makes unequal skill distribution less costly
and hence more likely to be socially optimal. Figure 1 confirms this: fixing γ and σ (i.e. looking
at each sub-figure), θ∗ changes from 0 to 1 as β increases. Also, observe that as we prove in
section 3, when β = 1, θ∗ = 0, which is true in all four sub-figures.
Second, again similar to the full information case, a more convex disutility (higher γ) implies
that
l∗L
l∗H
has to be higher. Thus, increasing skill inequality (lower θ) increases output less, and
hence is less likely to be optimal. In Figure 1, holding σ and β constant, a higher γ (from 2 to
4) makes θ∗ = 1 more likely. For instance, when σ = 0.5 and β = 1.5, θ∗ changes from 0 to 1
when γ goes up from 2 to 4.
The third parameter that matters for the optimal θ is σ, the concavity parameter of the utility
function. Under private information, for any σ, if the planner wants the high type to produce
more output, he must provide the high type with incentives to do that, meaning cH > cL. Now,
keeping everything else constant, if we look at an economy with a higher σ, the planner would
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like to set consumption levels of the two types closer to each other. To do this, however, the
planner has to close the gap between lH and lL, which makes skill equality more appealing. In
Figure 1, holding β and γ constant, a higher σ (from 0.5 to 3) makes θ∗ = 1 more likely. For
instance, when γ = 2 and β = 1.5, θ∗ changes from 0 to 1 when σ goes up from 0.5 to 3.
4.2 Additive innate skills
We showed in section 3 that the socially optimal skill distribution is perfectly unequal, meaning
θ∗ = 0. However, one might think that all the people in an economy are born with a certain
level of innate skills that the planner cannot grab away from them. We incorporate this into
our analysis by considering the baseline model with linear skill constraint in which everyone has
K > 0 units of innate skills. Hence the skill level of type L is wL +K and the skill level of type
H is wH + K, where plwL + pHwH = α. The question we ask in this subsection is whether the
socially optimal skill distribution is still the perfectly unequal one, meaning θ∗ = w
∗
L
w∗H
= 0.
Define θ˜ = wL+K
wH+K
and α˜ = α + K. Then, we can write the feasibility in the form similar to
before:
pHcH + pLcL ≤ α˜lH + α˜pLθ˜(lL − lH)
pH + pLθ˜
. (7)
Incentive compatibility becomes:
u(cH)− v(lH) ≥ u(cL)− v(θ˜lL).
This problem is exactly the same as the problem in the baseline model where the average
skill in society is α˜ and the planner is restricted to choosing among skill distributions in which
each mass point has to be greater than or equal to K. This means that the domain of θ˜ for the
planner is
θ˜ ∈ [ K
α/pH +K
, 1].
In all four sub-figures of Figure 1 we can see that even in the extended model with innate
skills and linear skill constraint (β = 1), an interior distribution is never optimal. In particular,
when K is low relative to α, the lower bound on θ˜ is low and the figures tell us that we still
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Figure 1:
Value Functions
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have θ∗ = 0 (θ˜∗ = K
α/pH+K
) to be socially optimal. When K is high enough relative to α, the
lower bound on θ˜ is high and hence θ∗ can be equal to 0 or 1, depending on the concavity of the
utility function. In a similar fashion, one can also show that the extreme result of either θ∗ = 0
or θ∗ = 1 is robust to introducing innate abilities to the convex skill constraint model.
4.3 Three types
So far we have assumed that the planner is allowed to choose discrete distributions with two
mass points. In this subsection, we ask if the extremity of the socially optimal skill distribution
depends on this assumption. We analyze the baseline model of section 3 and allow the planner to
choose discrete distributions with three mass points. As in section 3, we find that the perfectly
unequal skill distribution, in which one type receives all the skills and the rest receive none, is
socially optimal.
Planning Problem:
max
w1,w2,w3,c1,l1,c2,l2,c3,l3
p3[u(c3)− v(l3)] + p2[u(c2)− v(l2)] + p1[u(c1)− v(l1)]
s.t.
p3c3 + p2c2 + p1c1 ≤ p3w3l3 + p2w2l2 + p1w1l1, (8)
p1w1 + p2w2 + p3w3 ≤ α, (9)
w1, w2, w3, c1, c2, c3, l1, l2, l3 ≥ 0. (10)
u(ci)− v(li) ≥ u(cj)− v(wjwi lj), for i,j=1,2,3. (11)
As we did previously, by H we denote the type that receives the highest skills in the distri-
bution chosen by the planner, by M the type that receives medium skills, and by L the other
type, i.e., wi = wH , wj = wM , and wk = wL, if wi > wj > wk. In addition, pi = pH , pj = pM ,
and pk = pL. Hence, redefine an allocation as (wH , wM , wL, cH , lH , cM , lM , cL, lL). We also define
θM =
wM
wH
and θL =
wL
wH
. The following theorem provides the formal result.
Theorem 5. Both under full information and private information, θ∗L = θ
∗
M = 0 is socially
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optimal.
Proof. The proof for the full information case is exactly the same as the proof of Theorem 1.
Hence, we provide the proof of the private information case only.
Suppose for contradiction that both θ∗L and θ
∗
M are strictly positive (other cases are straight-
forward implications of the two-type case).
There are three possibilities.
Case 1. l∗H ≥ l∗i for i = M,L.
Consider a new allocation in which we set θL = θM = 0, lL = lM = 0, and lH = l
∗
H .
This weakly increases total output and strictly decreases total disutility. We construct the
consumption part of the new allocation in the following way. Set cM = cL, and u(cH)− v(l∗H) =
u(cM)− v(0). To show that such a consumption allocation is achievable, we first show u(αl∗H)−
v(l∗H) > u(0)−v(0). Suppose not. Then, u(c∗H)−v(l∗H) ≤ u(0)−v(0), which implies u(c∗L)−v(l∗L) <
u(c∗M)− v(l∗M) < u(c∗H)− v(l∗H) ≤ u(0)− v(0), which is a contradiction because then ci = li = 0
for all i allocation dominates the efficient allocation. Hence, in the new allocation we have
u(cH) − v(l∗H) = u(cM) − v(0) = u(cL) − v(0). If cH ≥ c∗H , then type H is better off, which
further implies type L and type M are strictly better off. This means that the new allocation
is an improvement over the efficient one, which is a contradiction. If cH < c
∗
H , then another
consumption allocation in which we set cH equals to c
∗
H and divide the rest of the output equally
between type L and type M provides a strictly higher total welfare compared to the efficient
allocation because type H’s welfare is unchanged and type L and type M ’s average welfare
strictly increases (as the total output they consume is higher and they share it equally). This
allocation is obviously incentive compatible, which again means that it is an improvement over
the efficient allocation, once again a contradiction.
Case 2. l∗H < l
∗
L.
Consider a new allocation in which we increase θL and θM by setting wH = w
∗
H −  and
w˜L = w
∗
L + pH/pL, and leave the rest of the efficient allocation unchanged. This increases the
total output and relaxes the incentive constraint from type H to type M and type M to type
L, creating a contradiction.
Case 3. l∗L ≤ l∗H < l∗M .
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Consider a new allocation in which we set wL = 0, keep θM unchanged, i.e.,
wM
wH
=
w∗M
w∗H
, set
lL = 0, and keep l
∗
M and l
∗
H unchanged. This strictly increases total output and decreases type
L’s disutility to 0.
We construct the consumption allocation such that incentive constraints hold with equality
and total output is used up for consumption: u(cH) − v(l∗H) = u(cM) − v(θM l∗M) and u(cM) −
v(l∗M) = u(cL)− v(0).
To see that we can find such a consumption allocation, observe that if we divide all of the
output between cM and cH such that type H’s incentive constraint holds with equality, we
obtain u(cH)− v(l∗H) > u(0)− v(0), u(cM)− v(l∗M) > u(0)− v(0). Suppose that the first strict
inequality does not hold. Then, u(c∗H) − v(l∗H) ≤ u(0) − v(0), which gives a contradiction in a
similar way as in case 1. Now suppose for contradiction that u(c˜M)−v(l∗M) ≤ u(0)−v(0). Then,
consider a new allocation in which we give both type L and M (0, 0) and type H (c∗H , l
∗
H). This is
incentive compatible, feasible, and gives a strictly higher utility, which is a contradiction. Now,
decrease cM , cH and increase cL until the incentive constraint of type M holds with equality,
keeping the incentive constraint of type H holding with equality. In this way we construct our
consumption allocation. We argue that in this allocation cH > c
∗
H , which also implies cM > c
∗
M
due to incentive constraint of type H holding with equality. Suppose that cH ≤ c∗H . This implies
cM ≤ c∗M and cL > c∗L (as the total output is increased in the new allocation), which implies
u(cM) − v(l∗M) ≤ u(cM) − v(l∗M) < u(cL) − v(0), which contradicts the type M ’s incentive
constraint holding with equality. Thus, cH > c
∗
H and cM > c
∗
M .
Hence, in the perturbed allocation, type M and type H welfare is strictly increased, and type
L welfare is increased because u(cM)− v(l∗M) = u(cL)− v(0) > u(c∗M)− v(l∗M) > u(c∗L)− v(l∗L).
Thus, perturbed allocation offers an improvement over the efficient allocation, yielding the
desired contradiction.
5 Conclusion
This paper has studied the socially optimal distribution of skills in a Mirrleesian economy. We
have shown that optimal skill distribution is either perfectly equal or perfectly unequal, but
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an interior level of skill inequality is never optimal. We have also provided conditions on the
parameters under which perfectly equal and perfectly unequal skill distributions are optimal.
We acknowledge that our analysis is purely theoretical, and we do not take a stance on any
particular interpretation of the skill distribution choice. However, we believe that our model
of skill distribution choice could serve as a benchmark for analyzing policy questions regarding
education and SBTC. A normative analysis of that kind would require a modification and
enrichment of the current model tailored to the specific policy question at hand. We believe
that such an analysis of education and SBTC policies based on our model could be an interesting
line of future research.
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